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Abstract
Indigenous women are significantly overrepresented in homocide statistics in colonial
states around the world. The term femicide is currently defined in international legal and political
frameworks as ‘the killing of women and girls because of their gender.’ This definition, while
seemingly straightforward, is limited by its racelessness and by the way colonial logic constructs
gender. By deconstructing colonial logic, it becomes evident that the gender binary itself, is a
colonial attempt to dehumanize the group which it terms ‘Indigenous women.’ My research
evaluates solutions to decolonizing ‘femicide’ in international frameworks through an extensive
literature review of decolonial feminist scholarship. The only solution to observing femicide
clearly, is to deconstruct the category based logic of colonial modernity. In seeing beyond what
is accepted as common sense, it becomes clear that coloniality manifested through race, gender,
class, and space work congruously to construct the frame that sees Indigenous women as
inhuman and disposable in colonial societies. Therein, deconstructing the concept of femicide in
international legal and political frameworks is integral to better addressing the violence
experienced by Indigenous women.
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Introduction
In Canada, Indigenous women compose 16 percent of all female homicide victims where
they represent only 4 percent of the overall population and similar trends persist across colonial
societies worldwide.1 This is no aimless concurrence; Indigenous women are intended victims of
femicide. As the ensuing discussion will demonstrate, femicide is constructed as a product of
colonial conquest that specifically targets Indigenous women. The intention of this literature
review is to underline the need to decolonize the term ‘femicide’ in international law through a
decolonial feminist approach. This will be accomplished through six sections that provide
distinct contributions to the discussion. First, an elaboration on the ways femicide has been
defined in contemporary scholarship relating to international law. Second, an analysis of colonial
history which demonstrates the dehumanization of Indigenous women in colonial societies.
Third, a critique of the radical feminist conception of femicide which has failed to provide
visibility for gendered violence against Indigenous women. Fourth, a demonstration of the
coloniality embedded in international frameworks surrounding Violence Against Women
(VAW) and the need to decolonize femicide accordingly. Fifth, a discussion of the solutions
proposed to decolonize the concept in international frameworks in hopes of moving towards a
decolonial feminist approach. Sixth and finally, a case study of Indigenous femicide in Canada
will demonstrate how the national inquiry has failed to fully identify the colonial structures
perpetuating femicide. Thereby, the concept of ‘femicide’ needs to be decolonized in
international legal and political frameworks to assure the visibility of Indigenous women.

Jenna Walsh, 2017, “The National Inquiry into the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women
and Girls of Canada: A Probe in Peril.” Indigenous Law Bulletin 8 (30): 6.
1
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Defining Femicide
‘Femicide’ finds it roots from the term homicide. Homicide comes from the Latin word
hom meaning man. Homicide is dually definable, because it often refers to “‘the killing of one
human being by another’ but also ‘as a person who kills another.’”2 Femicide however, has
conventionally been used to define to the killing of women. In other words, femicide is most
commonly used in situations where women are victim to the murder. This however, often
excludes murder committed during war time. Goldstein’s thesis justifiably suggests that colonial
conquest itself and the increased level of violence experienced by women is an extension of the
gendered exploits experienced by women in wartime.3 Yet, much of the contemporary violence
endured by Indigenous women is not classified as war time deaths under common law. This
contentious matter certainly could be further assessed. With the intention of critiquing the law
for its colonial disposition this discussion will mainly focus on femicide in its non-war time
existence as recognized by colonial law. This however is fully supplemented by the recognition
that common law wrongly asserts colonial societies as at peace. Therein, at its most basic level
femicide is defined as, “the killing of a woman.”4
Given the broadness of this term, scholars have attempted to narrow the definition on
multiple occasions. This has led to a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon
which sees femicide as directly relational to patriarchal structures of power. However, each
definition is not without its flaws. To begin, an evaluation of a definition that seeks to limit the

Diana E. H. Russell, 2002, “Defining Femicide and Related Concepts,” In Femicide in Global
Perspective eds. Diana E. H. Russell and Roberta A. Harmes (New York: Teachers College
Press): 12.
3 Joshua Goldstein, 2001, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press): 332.
4
Russell, 2002, 14.
2
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perpetrator status to only men. Second, another definition furthered this notion by inciting the
need for misogynist or sexist motive on part of the perpetrator. Thirdly, a definition of the term
which includes women as potential perpetrators of femicide. Most noticeably, race is not
explicitly included in any of the definitions evaluated. For the purposes of this paper, race is
conceptualized using Mills delineation in The Racial Contract. With this, race is understood as a
constructed status which attempts to mark non-white people as lesser than white people in the
ultimate governing system of white supremacy. This system as described by Mills is, “a political
system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and
norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens,
rights and duties.”5 Rather than observing race as a fundamental pillar of gender related
oppression, it is computed by many scholars as a mere definitional complication.6 However as
asserted by Mills, race is both fundamental and foundational to every oppression by and large.
Owing to this, each definition of ‘femicide’ evaluated is admittedly flawed in this omission. Still,
I intend to reflect on the definition that will provide the starting point to understand the violence
perpetrated against Indigenous women in colonial settings.
First, many scholars have put forth that the definition of femicide should be limited to
situations of men killing women. Dawson proposes the definition of femicide as “the killing of
women by men.”7 At present, gendered violence is often embedded in gender neutral or male

5

Charles W. Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 3.
Sharene H. Razack, 2016, “Gendering Disposability,” Canadian Journal of Women and the
Law 28 (2): 292.
7
Myrna Dawson, 2016, “Punishing Femicide: Criminal Justice Responses to the
Killing of Women over Four Decades,” Current Sociology 64(7): 997,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392115611192
6
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biased terms such as homicide and manslaughter.8 Much like the abeyance of race in the
definition of femicide works to downplay the disparity between white and non-white victims,
gender neutral language severely downplays the gender disparity in perpetrators of femicide.
Accordingly, a definition which establishes the perpetrator’s gender, provides better access to the
forces that substantiate the disproportionality of women reflected in victim statistics and men in
perpetrator statistics. As discussed by Ingala-Smith, an average across countries suggests men
are thought to compose up to 70% of all perpetrators in female homicide cases.9 In the case of
female killing specifically, the overwhelming majority of murders of women are perpetrated by
men.10 With this, it only seems a proportionate reflection that the concept of femicide should
specify an act of men killing women. As suggested by Dawson, the information needed to
observe femicide is relatively easy to extract under this definition; statistics on the perpetrator’s
gender are more readily available than the perpetrator’s motive.11 Though as Ingala-Smith
specifies, obtaining even simple information such as the sex of the perpetrator and victim can be
difficult depending on the country.12 Permitting such information can be obtained, Dawson
specifies that the information is the “most obvious and easy to document for prevalence and
comparative purposes.”13 This accompanies tertiary benefits that come with accruing a greater
amount of information that is relevant across borders; this is an attribute when studying the
phenomenon in the global context because it offers greater comparability.

Karen Ingala-Smith, 2018. “Femicide,” In The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Violence
eds. Nancy Lombard (New York: Routledge): 160; Russell & Harmes, 2002, 8.
9 Karen Ingala-Smith, 2018, 160.
10
Diana E. H. Russell, 2002, “Introduction: The Politics of Femicide,” In Femicide in Global
Perspective eds. Diana E. H. Russell and Roberta A. Harmes (New York: Teachers College
Press): 5.
11 Dawson, 2016, 997.
12
Ingala-Smith, 2018, 160.
13
Dawson, 2016, 997.
8
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However, this definition promotes a subtext which potentially increases the oppression of
women as gendered objects. This definition is at risk of underlining consequentialist tropes
which normalize the narrative that women are objects of unavoidable violence. Marcus’s
gendered grammar of violence proscribes, a definition which characterizes women as inherently
vulnerable (1) undermines female agency and (2) naturalizes women as objects of violence.14 As
Garcia-Del Moral discussed, it “‘positions men as “the subjects of violence” and women as “the
objects of violence and subjects of fear.’”15 This is non-constructive because it does little to
change the narrative and advocate for an alternate reality where women are not abundantly
overrepresented in victim statistics. Furthermore, it suggests that all women are subjects of the
same narrative. As will be discussed later, white women and Indigenous women are illustrated in
colonial societies by very different narratives.16 Recognizing the first named limitation, scholars
attempted to add greater context to the definition by more precisely identifying the patriarchal
structures which substantiate these realities.
Second, femicide is conceptualized as a man killing a woman on accord of misogynist or
sexist pretense. Dianna E. H. Russell is the founding supporter of this definition and cites
femicide as, “the killing of females by males because they are females.”17 Though Garcia-Del
Moral argues that Russel’s definition continues to place women as the “objects of violence.”18

Marcus, Sharon. 1992. “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape
Prevention.” In Feminists Theorize the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, (New York:
Routledge): 395.
15
Paulina Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, “The Murders of Indigenous Women in Canada as
Feminicides: Toward a Decolonial Intersectional Reconceptualization of Femicide,” Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture & Society 43 (4): 933, https://doi.org/10.1086/696692.
16 Maria Lugones, 2016, “The Coloniality of Gender,” In The Palgrave Handbook of Gender and
Development eds. Harcourt Wendy (Palgrave Macmillan: London): 25,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3_2
17 Russell, 2002, 13.
18 Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 934.
14
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Russell asserts that a definition which includes sexist or misogynist pretense, can help unmask
the underlying context for violence. Russell states:
“The murder and mutilation of a woman is not considered a political event. Men tell us
that they cannot be blamed for what a few maniacs do. Yet the very process of denying
the political content of the terror helps to perpetuate it, keeps us weak, vulnerable, and
fearful. These are the twentieth century witchburnings. The socalled maniacs who
commit these atrocities are acting out the logical conclusion of the woman hatred which
pervades the entire culture.19
By citing femicidal killings as gender motivated, it asserts a space to recognize the underlying
forces of said violence; one of the most notable benefits of this definition. Furthermore, Russell’s
definition favourably encompasses both misogynist and sexist killings. Misogynist killings
describe killings motivated by the general hatred of females, sexist killings are “motivated by a
sense of entitlement to and/or superiority over females, by pleasure of sadistic desires towards
them, and/or by an assumption of ownership over women.” 20 By stating “because they are
females,” Russell avoids specifying whether killings need to constitute misogyny or sexism in
order to be classified as femicide. Given that both are underpinned by patriarchal power
disparities, this definition best captures the context that the concept of femicide is meant to
address.
This definition could be weak when employed in legal settings. Though the definition
more accurately describes what the term ‘femicide’ is attempting to observe, it may not be as

Diana E. H. Russell, 2012, “Introductory Speech,” Transcript of speech presented to the
United Nations Symposium on Femicide (Vienna: November 26), 1-2,
https://www.femicideincanada.ca/sites/default/files/201712/RUSSELL%20%282012%29%20DEFINING%20FEMICIDE.pdf
20 Russell, 2002, 14.
19
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easy to prove. In legal proceedings, establishing intent can be challenging because it is difficult
to provide tangible proof of it.21 Russell purposefully avoids the concept of ‘intent’ or
‘intentional’ within the definition because it is too discriminatory. Russell critiques Ellis &
DeKeseredy’s conception that contends that femicide should not discriminate between
intentional and non-intentional killings.22 She cites that defining femicide as “intentional
murder” is inhibiting because non-intentional murders can also constitute femicide. The example
put forth is a “battering husband who may not have intended to kill his wife when he attacked
her.”23 Most agree that such a scenario warrants femicide, though it remains in the absence of
intent to kill. However, despite Russell’s attempt to avoid intention, the definition put forth is
stymied by the fact that it remains difficult to assess whether a man killed a woman because she
was female, without establishing intent. Accordingly, Russell’s definition may better access the
concept of femicide but its application risks being illusive in legal terms. Russell addresses this
issue,
Although inferring motives can be difficult or even impossible at times, all hate crimes
require the assessment of the criminals’ motives. However, it seems doubtful that any
politically progressive individual would endorse forgoing the concept of racist murder
because of the difficulty of establishing motive.24
Accordingly, this definition provides an instance where discriminatory power might be a better
vehicle for advocacy than legal applicability because it identifies the underlying gender

21

Russell, 2002, 15.
Desmond Ellis & Walter S. DeKeseredy. 1996. “Homicide and Femicide.” In The Wrong
Stuff: An Introduction to Sociological Study of Deviance eds. Desmond Ellis & Walter S.
DeKeseredy (Scarborough: Allyn and Bacon Canada): 70.
23 Russell, 2002, 15.
24 Russell, 2002, 15.
22
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hierarchies that facilitate violence against women. Still and as will be discussed, the absence of
race leaves this definition utterly incomplete.
Third, a definition of femicide that includes females as potential perpetrators. Campbell
& Runyan define femicide as “all killings of women, regardless of motive or perpetrator
status.”25 Evidenced by the use of the word “regardless,” Campbell & Runyan indicate that they
are willing to consider females as potential perpetrators of femicide. Though as previously
stated, this definition is wholly problematic because it fails to relate gendered violence to
structures which specifically privilege men. I will address the complications of this definition by
evaluating the two major clauses put forth, ‘regardless of perpetrator status’ and ‘regardless of
motive.’ To begin, the mention of ‘regardless of perpetrator status,’ signifies the attempt to
neutralize the relationship between perpetrator’s gender and the perpetrator. This is most likely
an attempt by Campbell & Runyan to create an all-inclusive definition that suggests all female
killings have the potential to be femicide. However, others have demonstrated that this accrues
more harm than good because it distracts from the gender dynamics at play. First, Campbell &
Runyan’s definition is merely a distortion of reality by omission; statistics demonstrate that men
compose the overwhelming majority of perpetrators of female killing.26 By including women as
potential perpetrators of femicide, it risks downplaying the encircling reality that demonstrates
femicide as predominantly male perpetrated.27 Moreover, Ingala-Smith indicates that sex neutral
language in this context leads to invisibility not inclusivity. For example, when a woman is killed
out of misogynist entitlement and it is termed manslaughter, it fails to identify the larger colonial

Jacquelyn Campbell & Carol W. Runyan. 1998. “Femicide: Guest Editors Introduction.”
Homicide Studies 2 (4): 348.
26 Russell, 2002, 5.
27 Ingala-Smith, 2018, 160; Russell, 2002, 15.
25
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culture which authorizes violence against women because it suggests that said killing is not
different than a man killing another man. However, a man killing another man is distinct from a
man killing a woman because colonial power structures abundantly privilege men. With this, the
social structures that facilitate a woman’s vulnerability to violence by men, becomes invisible in
the definition of manslaughter or murder. Ingala-Smith further asserts, this ‘gender-neutral’
language can “render the killing of women invisible and making something invisible is not a
neutral act but serves a purpose.”28 Rather than de-naturalizing women as objects of violence,
this definition simply makes gendered violence invisible. Campbell & Runyan’s attempt for
inclusiveness in this definition by failing to specify the perpetrator’s sex, lacks the discriminatory
power to understand gendered violence as causally separate from homicide or manslaughter.
Next, the ‘regardless of motive’ part of this definition fails to place gendered killings as
an intended byproduct of colonial structures.29 Russell’s definition highlighted the importance of
contextualizing the killings. If in fact femicide is meant to observe killings as a part of a larger
structure of violence against women, Campbell & Runyan’s definition does not suffice because
their attempt for inclusivity is manifested as a lack of accuracy in describing the phenomenon.
Whether ‘femicide’ seeks to identify the causal patriarchal forces that support killing as
described by Russell or the overrepresentation of men in perpetrator statistics as described
Dawson, the inclusion of female perpetrators debunks the intention of asserting the definition of
femicide as different from homicide. If the intent of defining femicide separately from homicide
is to create visibility for gendered based violence, it requires the capacity to be discriminatory.30
This definition holds neither the capacity to identify the gender nor motive as a symptom of

28

Ingala-Smith, 2018, 161.
Russell, 2002, 15.
30
Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 933.
29
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patriarchal condoned violence. By neutralizing the relevance of the perpetrator’s gender and
failing to specify any relation to causal patriarchal structures, this definition does not hold the
discriminatory capacity to observe the structural components of the phenomenon at hand.31
Thereby, this definition can be seen as ineffective at defining femicide.
Upon consideration of each definition, I am inclined to side with the decolonial feminist
critique that the aforementioned definitions do not hold adequate appreciation for femicide in
colonial contexts. As stated, “Femicide is a limited concept to analyze the killing of women as a
product of intersecting structures of inequality and colonial histories.”32 Though imperfect,
Russell’s definition will provide the starting point for the basis of this analysis.33 To reiterate
Russell defines ‘femicide’ as, “the killing of females by males because they are females.”34 This
definition is appreciable for its consideration of patriarchal context. Furthermore, its inclusion of
sexist and misogynist killings is highly important in assessing entitlement killings observed
under the colonial context.35 However and as stated earlier, Russell’s definition is flawed in one
major way. As suggested by Garcia- Del Moral, Russell’s definition fails to recognize elements
beyond gender or sex.36 Russell’s definition sees “racial inequality as an added effect on the
gendered oppression.”37 For the case of Indigenous women, Indigenous women are not murdered
just “because they are females” and because they are Indigenous; they are murdered because they
are Indigenous females. Russell’s definition insufficiently characterizes this issue because the
experience of gendered violence for Indigenous women is constructed by an entirely different

31

Russell, 2002, 16.
Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 929.
33 Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 933.
34 Russell, 2002, 13.
35
Razack, 2016, 290.
36 Garcia-De Moral, 2018, 935.
37 Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 945.
32
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reality than gendered violence for non-Indigenous women. As discussed by Razack, “If one
approaches these deaths as the outcome of a generic male violence against women, then race and
coloniality enter as mere complications.”38 Colonial history constructed a very specific frame
which dehumanizes Indigenous women and targets them as objects of violence and
disposability.39 In the following section, I will redress colonial history to demonstrate how these
frames have dehumanized Indigenous women in colonial societies.

Colonialism: The History of Dehumanization
Indigenous women are uniquely framed in the Western patriarchal context as deserving
objects of violence. As this section will prove, this is done through a process of dehumanization.
As conceptualized by Bustamante, Jashnani & Stoudt, cumulative dehumanization encompasses:
(i) an active condition of becoming, experienced as an accumulation of dehumanizing
moments, structurally imposed on racialized communities under siege; (ii) a wearing
down of the racialized and affective body, creating circuits of dispossession for entire
communities; (iii) a product and (re) producer of the material and ideological modes
undergirding racial capitalism; and (iv) a force met with individual and collective
resistance.40

38

Razack, 2016, 292.
Rosemary Nagy, 2015, “Combatting Violence Against Indigenous Women: Reconciliation as
Decolonisation for Canada’s Stolen Sisters,” In Rape Justice: Beyond the Criminal Law ed.
Nicola Henry, Anastasia Powell & Asher Flynn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015):
183-184, https://ebookcentral-proquest com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/lib/west/detail.action?doc
ID=4001073; Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 943; Razack, 2016, 290.
40 Priscilla Busamante, Gaurav Jashnani & Brett G. Stoudt, 2018, “Theorizing Cumulative
Dehumanization: An Embodied Praxis of ‘Becoming’ and Resisting Sanctioned Violence,”
Social and Personality Psychology Compass 13(1): 1, https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12429
39
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Cumulative dehumanization is compounded by the construct of violence which “exacerbates
racial inequality and normalizes further structural violence, while simultaneously legitimating
and perpetuating the cultural violence that maintains racial capitalism.”41 Western human rights
jargon falsely asserts personhood is a matter of biological inheritance. However as discussed by
Fregoso, “Humanity is a status that can be taken away and given back.”42 Being classified as a
human deserving of rights, is very much a social construction which maintains exclusion through
the process of cumulative dehumanization previously discussed.
In this section, I attempt to unpack some of the frames and processes that led to the
cumulative dehumanization of Indigenous women in colonial societies. First, I will discuss
gender as a manifestation of colonialism itself. Second, the colonial construction of Indigenous
women as sexualized gendered and objects led to their exclusion from personhood. Third, this
was followed by process of abjection and othering which assured their exclusion under morality
and law. Fourth, elements such as class and space work as reinforcements of the aforementioned
frames which deepen the level of dehumanization experienced by Indigenous women. Fifth, the
media continues to reinforce these colonial imposed frames as a masked attempt of bringing
awareness to the issue of Indigenous femicide. Taken together, these forces effectively
dehumanized Indigenous women and placed them as naturalized objects of violence in colonial
settler societies.
First, gender as it exists in present colonial societies is entirely a concept of colonial
imposition. Gender and the binary that exists between man and women, is a product of colonial

41

Busamante, Jashnani & Stoudt, 2018, 8.
Rosa-Linda Fregoso, 2014, “For a Pluriversal Declaration of Human Rights,” American
Quarterly 66(3): 585, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43823420.
42
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modernity and its use of categorical logic meant to reinforce hierarchy.43 Oppositional binaries
and the concept of ‘woman’ and ‘man,’ is a dichotomy engineered to conquer and divide.44 The
Eurocentric view observes Europe as the mecca of modernization. Out of the enlightenment, the
European man was constructed as an extension of this reputation; rational, civilized and
advanced. Conversely, European women were constructed as naturalized unequal’s. Lugones
stated, “The European bourgeois woman was not understood as his complement, but as someone
who reproduced race and capital through her sexual purity, passivity, and being home- bound in
the service of the white, European, bourgeois man.”45 This in part derives from post dark age
absolutist notions of familial structures that observe European husbands as having naturalized
authority over European wives.46 This very notion was used to assert that colonists had natural
authority over people they constructed as dependants.47 These sentiments were fundamentally
adopted, strengthened by the state and were used to justify the mission of ‘civilization’ that
ensued under colonial rule. However, as pointed out by Lugones, there was never a ‘civilizing’
mission because the construction of civilian vs. non-civilian and man vs. women, is an attempt
by colonizers to dehumanize persons who are not white men.48 With this, the terms ‘man’ and
‘woman’ become markers of humanity more than they were ever markers of sex or gender.49

María Lugones, 2010, “Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” Hypatia 25(4):742.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40928654
44
Lucy Nicholas & Christine Agius, 2018, The Persistence of Global Masculinism: Discourse,
Gender, and Neo-Colonial Re-Articulations of Violence (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan): 7,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68360-7
45
Lugones, 2010, 743.
46
Vrushali Patil, 2013, “From Patriarchy to Intersectionality: A Transnational Feminist
Assessment of How Far We’ve Really Come,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
38(4):854, http://www.jstor.com/stable/10.1086/669560
47
Patil, 2013, 848.
48
Lugones, 2010, 745.
49 Garcia-Del Moral, 2018, 943.
43
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Accordingly, Indigenous peoples are not just a man or a woman, but a non-white non-man and a
non-white non-woman.50 In the following paragraph, I will address arguments that assert that
gender and the idea of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ did exist prior to colonization.
Prior to colonial contact, many scholars assert that Indigenous communities could be
largely defined as matriarchal societies.51 Naming pre-colonial Indigenous societies as
‘matriarchal,’ has dually served as evidence which confirms that gender did exist prior to
colonial rule. However, this assumption wrongly conflates Eurocentric conceptions of gender
and Indigenous understandings of gender. To begin, pre-colonial Indigenous communities
recognized more than two ‘genders’ and held fluid presumptions regarding what constituted
them; two spirit individuals are a reflection of this. In many Indigenous societies, gender is
considered more behavioural than biological. As Gunn Allen asserts, “gender is understood in a
psychological or psychospirtual sense much more than in a physiological one.”52 Next, gender
did not serve as a hierarchical indicator in pre-colonial Indigenous societies. As stated, “gender
has never been an organizing principle or hierarchical category in tribal communities before
‘contact.’ In Native American communities, the sexual division of labour did not exist, and
economic relations were based on reciprocity and complementarity.”53 In contrast, Eurocentric
conceptions of gender are founded on (1) observing a close relationship between sex and gender
(2) establishing social hierarchy. Indigenous perceptions of gender are simply untranslatable to

50

Lugones, 2016, 25.
Paula Gunn Allen, 1992, The Sacred Hoop: Recovering Feminine in American Indian
Traditions (Boston: Beacon Press): 253.
52
Gunn Allen, 1992, 207.
53 Claudia De Lima Costa, 2016, “Gender and Equivocation: Notes on Decolonial Feminist
Translations,” In The Palgrave Handbook of Gender and Development ed. Harcourt Wendy
(Palgrave Macmillan: London): 51, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3_2
51
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Eurocentric conceptions of gender.54 Therein, gendered notions that existed prior in pre-colonial
Indigenous societies should be recognized as an entirely different concept.. This in which
reinforces the truth that gender and sex, as they are understood as ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ is a
colonial creation.55 Conclusively, gender itself and oppositional binaries are a manifestation of
the colonial desire to dehumanize non-white, non-male persons. Therein, from here forward, any
reference to “Indigenous ‘women’” is made under the understanding that such a classification is
rooted in colonial context and used merely for purposes of identifying a group which has been
especially targeted under colonial classification.
Second, the colonial construction of Indigenous women as sexualized gendered objects
framed their exclusion from personhood. Indigenous women were strategic targets of the process
of colonization. The egalitarian status enjoyed by women in pre-colonial society was a threat to
the Eurocentric patriarchy and the development of the capitalist colonial state.56 Federici
discusses how ‘witch hunts,’ woman hunting and mass male perpetrated attacks on women
throughout European history, are a calculated attempt to control a group whose existence
challenges the capitalist domination of men.57 The prospect of a system which gave women
power, was viewed as inherently threatening to male dominance; for any power held by women
is observed as a loss for men. Therein, the target placed on dehumanizing Indigenous women
was in part a reaction to the threat which Indigenous societies posed to a male dominated social
organization system. As discussed by Nagy, “The ‘demonization of Native women’ was part of

54

Goldstein, 2001, 2; Gunn Allen, 1992, 207; Patil, 2013, 855; Lugones, 2016, 15.
Lugones, 2010, 742.
56 Andrea Smith, 2003, “Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples,”
Hypatia 18(2): 76, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3811012; Nagy, 2015, 183; Sylvia Federici, 2004,
Caliban and The Witch (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia): 170.
57 Federici, 2004, 165.
55
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‘white men’s desires to maintain control over white women’, as well as the key to subjugating
indigenous peoples.”58 Accordingly, Indigenous women were targeted in specific ways that
relegated their power and dehumanized them in colonial society. The unique dehumanization of
Indigenous women in colonial society is justified by their relational value to European women.
In the following paragraph, I will evaluate the ways that coloniality juxtaposes European women
and Indigenous women.
European women and Indigenous ‘women’ are constructed in the colonial gaze in entirely
different ways. As previously discussed, Eurocentric ideas of gender view European men as the
perfect image of human and women, an inversion of this image. White women are considered
human, only for their ability reproduce race and capital.59 In contrast, Indigenous ‘women’ are
constructed in the colonial eye as a mere aberration of man, unworthy of personhood status and
unfit to reproduce race.60 Sexualization is central to how women are valued in colonial settler
societies because settler colonialism is based upon “special sovereign charge and regenerative
capacity” both of which are achieved through reproduction, solidifying white settlers as the
demographic majority and cementing this power through the construct of the state.61
Furthermore, Goldstein cites conquest as an extension of the violence and exploitation
experienced by women in wartime.62 With this, male sexuality becomes a foundation for
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aggression and feminization a symbol of conquest.63 For European women, their ability to
uphold the moral order and reproduce is founded in passivity and purity. Conversely, Indigenous
women are constructed as “promiscuous, grotesquely sexual, and sinful.”64 This construction
prevents Indigenous women from personhood and renders them unable to serve European men in
purist social reproduction.65 By gendering Indigenous women, their value to colonial society
becomes relational to the function they provide to European men. These kind of sentiments are
reinforced by stories of exception. For example, Sacajawea, Pocahontas and La Malinche were
permitted to bore children with European men, only after proving their value by acting as
collaborators in conquest.66 This too is a reflection of provisions of the Indian Act which
predicated that in order to marry a European man, Indigenous women were required to relegate
their ‘Indian’ status. By forcing Indigenous women to relegate their status, it reflects a broader
goal of settler colonialism which seeks to “jeopardize the very existence of the historic
Indigenous communities.”67 Cohesively, these examples illustrate that Indigenous women are
valued in colonial societies only by the function they serve European men. By dehumanizing and
sexually demonizing Indigenous women, European men constructed them as disposable; justified
by the constructed superior functionality of white women.68 Resultantly, the process of gendering
Indigenous women was an intentional plot to dehumanize them in colonial settler societies.
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Third, the dehumanization of Indigenous women was reinforced by processes of othering
and abjection which assured their exclusion from morality and law. The construction of
Indigenous women as deviously sexual, immoral, and disposable, afforded them less respect than
Indigenous men.69 This dehumanization was reinforced by a process of othering and abjection
that placed Indigenous women not only at the bottom of the colonial hierarchy, but outside the
moral order of society.70 The processes of othering and abjection work cohesively and
encompass many of the same frames. Though to demonstrate the different processes of
subjectivity at play, the process of othering will be used to explain marginalization of all
Indigenous women and the process of abjection will be used to explain the apathy which society
holds towards victims of Indigenous femicide. Below, I will explain each in greater depth and
demonstrate their relevance to the dehumanization of Indigenous women.
‘Othering’ is defined as “the process whereby an individual or groups of people attribute
negative characteristics to other individuals or groups of people that set them apart as
representing that which is opposite to them.”71 This too which reflects the divisive based
thought of Western colonial subjectivity. One way that colonizers established Indigenous women
as the ‘other’ was through the conflation of Indigenous women as prostitutes. Examined by
Simone de Beauvoir, women generally are objects of the ‘other,’ only to be defined by their
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proximity to the man who defines what it means to be human.72 As discussed previously,
Indigenous women were constructed by colonizers as ‘grotesquely sexual,’ ‘disposable,’ and
‘sinful.’73 To supplement this narrative, colonizers naturalized Indigenous women in the context
of prostitution. Female sexuality holds negative connotation in colonial societies and by framing
Indigenous women as prostitutes, it helped to simplify the negative frame for the rest of society
to evaluate their humanity.74 This frame was then utilized as a technology to ‘other’ Indigenous
women; illustrating them as inhuman and undeserving of the benefits of morality. This too
excluded Indigenous women from the protection of the law.75 There is an inseparable
relationship between what constitutes what is defined as human, and who qualifies for protection
under white made Western law.76 Indigenous bodies and prostitutes alike are viewed as violable
in colonial societies.77 As discussed by Smith, “only a body that is ‘pure’ can be violated.”78
With this, Indigenous women were effectively placed outside the bounds of law and morality
which rendered them as the ‘other.’ Palmater furthers this argument by demonstrating the ways
in which the Indian Act was intentionally discriminatory to women for the reason of othering
them.79 For example, many revisions that outwardly claimed to reduce gender discrimination
such as Bill C-31, made outsiders out of women who were newly eligible to reclaim their status.
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By proscribing ‘Indianness’ as a matter of what Palmater terms as ‘blood quantum,’ described as
the degree of decent, the state was able to further ‘other’ Indigenous women who had been
previously classified out of their status.80 Therein, the process of ‘othering’ Indigenous women
was dually achieved through means of narrative building and law, both in which dehumanized
them and assured their exclusion from the moral bounds of society.
Conversely, abjection refers to the reaction “to a threatened breakdown in meaning
caused by the loss of the distinction between subject and object or between self and other.”81 The
deaths of Indigenous women often go unnoticed because they merely reinforce a distinction
between the self and other in colonial society; where Indigenous women firmly establish the
‘other.’82 However, a breakdown in the distinction between self and other most strongly occurs
where the subjects own ‘materiality and frailty’ are questioned; where the fragility of the line
between life and death becomes most evident.83 To illustrate instances where abjection occurs
and this distinction breaks down, I employ two examples. First, Crenshaw observes, “Prosecutors
who handle sexual assault cases acknowledge that they often exclude women as potential jurors
because women tend to empathize the least with the victim.”84 This is a clear manifestation of
the conscience rejecting vulnerability to death. Female jurors reproduce oppressive frames to
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justify the deaths of victimized women in an attempt to reassert their own safety and security in a
society plagued by gendered violence.85 This permits the deaths of Indigenous women to be
discarded as separate and unrelated to the broader structures of violence; reinforcing the
distinction between self and abject.86 Second, Razack discusses the case of Cindy Gladue, a Cree
women who bled to death after Bradley Barton, a white man, fisted and stabbed her vagina.87
Despite the horrific nature of the case, “few seemed to notice the death of an Indigenous woman
in the context of prostitution.”88 It did not warrant much media attention until the chief medical
examiner suggested bringing her wounded vagina into the court room for evidence. Public outcry
cited opposition on the grounds of inappropriateness, degradation, and dehumanization. While all
these grounds reasonably hold some validity, the public outcry too could be construed as a
reaction to a threatened breakdown between the subject and the abject, between life and death.89
By presenting the actual body, it is more difficult to conceptualize Indigenous women as
inhuman; it becomes more difficult to observe her as a deserving object of violence. This
disturbs the construction of the ‘other’ or the ‘abject’ as inhuman and elicits a reaction by the
public.90 Therein, these cases of abjection demonstrate breakdowns in the distinction between
self and other, exposing the frames in which dehumanization of Indigenous women occurs.
Conclusively, processes of ‘othering’ and abjection assert Indigenous women as non-human
objects deserving of violence.
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Fourth, elements such as class and space reinforce the aforementioned frames which
deepen the level of dehumanization experienced by Indigenous women. By naturalizing
Indigenous women as objects of the other or the abject, it influences their relation with other
intersections such as class and space. This works to solidify oppression in these realms and
simultaneously reinforces the frames initially used to other Indigenous women. Most
importantly, it disassociates the exploits of colonizers and implicitly justifies the other elements
of their vulnerability.91 Rather than gendered violence being maintained as the causal connection
between colonialism and femicide, class and space become default explanations for the violence
experienced by Indigenous women.92 Rather than their vulnerability being understood as a
product of colonial exploit, Indigenous women are observed as a product of their class and
environment. By naturalizing Indigenous women in the context of prostitution it becomes dually
associative with class and space. Though they are inherently linked, I will discuss class and
space separately.
To begin, class most notably blurs the colonial history which preceded the socioeconomic
status of Indigenous women, specifically for sex workers. Many people substantiate a connection
between socioeconomic status and sex work, though few extend the connection further back. As
discussed by Nagy, “Residential schooling is a direct explanation for the over-representation of
indigenous female homicides, particularly in the case of the most vulnerable women.”93 Issues of
dislocation, identity confusion, and sexual violence were further compounded by gender
discriminatory status provisions of the Indian Act and the sixties scoop which saw some 11,000
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children stolen from Indigenous families and put into the child welfare system.94 Instead of
observing the vulnerability of Indigenous women as a matter of the aforementioned colonial
exploits, their vulnerability is viewed as a matter of class spatiality. In summation, each of these
vulnerabilities therein becomes another reason for ‘othering’ said individuals.95 Courts have
played a fundamental role in affirming violence as a naturalized part of sex work, especially
when the bodies in question are Indigenous.96 This is demonstrated in the case of Pamela
George. George was “a woman of the Saulteaux (Ojibway) nation” who was brutally murdered
in Regina by two young white middle-class men who purchased her sexual services and upon
receiving them, beat her to death.97 “The defense naturalized the violence by framing it as
merely something that happens in prostitution and in those spaces.”98 Her status as an occasional
prostitute or as lower class, served to confirm violence as a naturalized experience of
Indigeneity.99 During the court proceedings, George’s mother commented “‘it felt she was on
trial because she was a prostitute.’”100 By identifying George as a prostitute, the court was able
to justify her ‘non-human’ status as a matter of class and the inherent dangers that accompany
existing as lower class.
In the same way that the experience of violence becomes an inherent consequence of
class, spaces become naturalized as inherently violence prone.101 These spaces become
characterized as natural contexts of violence, and in those contexts, the people within become
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‘destined’ objects of violence. To reiterate George’s case, George was picked up by her murders
in “the Stroll” which is known as a common area for prostitution in the city of Regina. As
discussed in relation to George’s case:
The history of dispossession, and its accompanying violence, that brought both Pamela
George and her murderers to the Stroll; white people's historic participation in and benefit
from that dispossession and violence; and the law's complicity in settler violence,
particularly through an insistence on racelessness and on contract, all remained invisible.
At the end of the day, the record showed only that two white "boys" lost control and an
Aboriginal woman got a little more than she bargained for.102
As mentioned, the classification of space relates back to the foundations of land dispossession.103
Wealthy white men are entitled to the land in its entirety, even in spaces labelled as violent they
find security whereas impoverished Indigenous women are only privy to lower class spaces and
still remain violable within them.104 This reality is entirely rooted in a colonial history which
wrongfully treats the establishment of reserve areas, deceitful treaty establishment, and the
confiscation of lands by government bodies as inherently legitimate. Razack asserts this
phenomenon as ‘slum administration’ replacing ‘colonial administration.’105 Federici echoes
these sentiments and discusses the specific intention of hunting women in settings colonially
asserted as ‘low class’ is a strategy of enclosure “serving to justify enslavement and genocide”
with intent of solidifying capital and power for the colonizer.106 Furthermore, by categorizing
these spaces on assertion of class, it actively works to mask the dispossession, oppression, and
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exploitation perpetrated by colonizers, which forced Indigenous people into the spaces which
colonizers assert as less than.107 Simply by existing in these spaces, Indigenous women are more
vulnerable. Yet, it is solely by colonial construct, that they are forced to exist in these spaces to
begin with.
Therein, class and space are often alienated from their colonial origins and used to defer
blame from colonizers onto the women themselves. Owing to the prevailing mentality that
socioeconomic status is largely a product of hard work and meritocracy, class is rarely attributed
to structural factors, especially in colonial societies. To understand vulnerability as a matter of
class perpetuated by colonialism, it requires the recognition that colonialism initially produced
and continues to produce such inequalities. As stated by Lugones, ““if the dialogue is to be had
with the modern man, his occupation of the colonial difference involves his redemption but also
his self-destruction.”108 In fear of accruing blame for continued oppression of Indigenous
women, it is much easier for colonial society to attribute the vulnerable situations of Indigenous
women to class or space abstractly, as opposed to understanding them as a regenerative product
of coloniality.109 By doing so, it deepens the frames established and works to further assert
Indigenous women as the ‘other.’110 Conclusively, the assertion that certain classes or spaces are
inherently prone to violence further dehumanizes Indigenous women as the other.111 In the next
argument, I will discuss how the media plays a primary and foundational role in reaffirming
these frames.
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Fifth, the media continues to reinforce these colonial imposed frames as a masked
attempt at bringing awareness to the issue of Indigenous femicide. Most specifically, this section
will look at the role of journalistic media. As stated by Garcia-Del Moral, “We cannot know
ourselves as subjects without constantly redrawing the boundaries that differentiate us from what
is not.”112 In order for frames to continue to exist they need to be reasserted regularly. As the
literature demonstrates, the media plays an integral role in reasserting the boundaries between
human and non-human, subject from other, and settler society from Indigenous women.113 In
doing so, it dulls the conscience of colonial society and results in a normalization of the
overrepresentation of Indigenous women in femicide statistics. To begin, media coverage tends
to naturalize or sensationalize stories involving Indigenous femicide, both of which dehumanize
Indigenous women. Furthermore, male perpetrators are reframed in a way that suggests their
inhumanity, which causes a disconnect between each instance of femicide and the larger
structure of gendered violence. Cohesively, this reproduces the narrative of Indigenous women
as in-human objects of violence.
As discussed, media coverage on cases of Indigenous femicide are naturalized or
sensationalized, both of which reinforce the dehumanization of Indigenous women. To begin, the
media naturalizes violence against Indigenous women. This is often done in two ways. First, by
presenting the case minimally in a “matter-of-fact manner.” As described by Godoy-Paiz, the
media often reports on cases of Indigenous femicide “containing indications only of where the
body was found, in what condition, and what time.”114 The repeated presence of these stories
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suggests the violence as expected rather than exceptional; justifying the invisibility of said
violence.115 Conversely, when the media covers the issues in a more elaborate manner, it often
suggests Indigenous women as products of their environment or situation. Media has long
dehumanized Indigenous women by reinforcing the frame that illustrates them as sex workers
and drug addicts; this renders victims as immoral and consequently unworthy of humanity in
colonial society. 116 As discussed, “nineteenth-century newspapers consistently depicted
Aboriginal women as ‘squalid and immoral’ even when they reported incidents of violence
against them at the hands of British men.”117 Though in masked terms, this pattern continues.
Indigenous women inherit the constructed ‘degeneracy’ of the spaces which they inhabit. For
example, victims who are associated with violent spaces such as Vancouver’s Downtown
Eastside or in areas surrounding the maquilias in Ciudad Juarez, are often overlooked as
inevitable victims of their environment.118 As discussed by Garcia-Del Moral, an article from the
Toronto Star cites Indigenous women are described as having “plummeted to the bottom of a
human cesspool inhabited by whores, drug addicts, and vagrants.”119This statement entirely
rooted in settler denialism which fails to recognize the causal exploits of colonization and the
perpetual reproduction of “exclusive dichotomies” that fixate on the notion of good and evil.
This in which reinforces a ‘blame the victim’ mentality and simultaneously expunges
colonialism from the story.”120

115

Godoy-Paiz, 2012, 98-99; Razack, 2016, 286.
Nagy, 2015, 188.
117 Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 38.
118 Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 47.
119 Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 46.
120 Nagy, 2015, 188.
116

Diebold 30
Next, the media sensationalizes the cases of Indigenous women in a way that reasserts
their constructed inhumanity. When cases of Indigenous femicide do receive substantial media
attention, they are sensationalized in accompaniment of the gory details of the murder.121
To distance the public from conscionable emotion, the media emphasizes the forensic and
scientific elements of the case. By focusing on the forensics, it simultaneously highlights the
gore of the murder whilst allowing the public to lose sight of the fact that women were
horrifically and brutally murdered.122 Garcia-Del Moral discussed, “the rationality of scientific
knowledge represents a glimmer of hope, a promise to solve what are otherwise portrayed as
irrational murders that are ‘as bad as a horror movie.’ Science and entertainment sanitize.”123
This too erases other elements of the story that could humanize Indigenous women in eyes of the
public. Rather than learning about the life story of the victim, the victim is relegated to a violated
corpse.124 Congruently, this reasserts the normalcy of violence against Indigenous women and
distances the public from feeling grief for their deaths. Furthermore, violent journalism often
sensationalizes the violence experienced by sexualizing the context of the murders.125 Article
titles such as “Orgy of Blood and Terror: The Body of a Raped Woman was Found,” are
exemplary of this.126 This article recounts the case where a women was gang-raped, tortured, and
thrown off of a bridge. The use of sexualized language in the article, renders the violence

121

Godoy-Paiz, 2012, 98.
Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 53.
123 Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 53.
124 Razack, 2000, 111.
125 Ignacio Corona, 2010, “Over Their Dead Bodies: Reading the Newspapers on Gender
Violence,” In Gender Violence at the US-Mexico Border: Media Representation and Public
Response eds. Hector Dominguez-Ruvalcaba & Ignacio Corona (Tucson: University of Arizona
Press): 114, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1814jwp
126 Garcia-Del Moral, 2011, 54.
122

Diebold 31
experienced by victims as an inadvertent byproduct of sexual entertainment gone too far.127 This
too normalizes violence against Indigenous women and reasserts the blame the victim mentality.
Therein, by sensationalizing the story by manner of scientification or sexualization, the actual
violence experienced by Indigenous women becomes distanced from the story and the broader
structure of gendered violence. As will be discussed in the following paragraph, this is
supplemented by a complimentary narrative which centralizes the perpetrator as a non-man, nonhuman.
Until this point, I have focused my discussion on the frames that directly supplement the
narrative regarding the humanity of Indigenous women. In this paragraph, I will discuss how the
media dually frames perpetrators in a way that distracts from the overhanging culture of
gendered violence. Sexual violence and femicidal violence are inherently tied by the myths that
insulate their existence. Colonial society has been taught to conceptualize rape and violence with
a fundamentally racialized lens. Racialization is “a psychosocial process explicitly involving the
visible body, perhaps most prominently highlights the racialized being as hypervisible as a
representation while invisible as a human being.”128 Accordingly, racialized persons are intended
targets of villanization because they are ‘hypervisible’ but not considered as a ‘human being.’ As
discussed by Burke, the “real rape script” involves a racialized male perpetrator who is a stranger
to the white female victim, violating her in a public setting.129 Owing to the deep entrenchment
of this myth, ‘real rape’ is entirely premised on the violation of whiteness.130 As previously
mentioned by Smith, only ‘pure’ bodies can be violated.131 While the rape of Indigenous women
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works to reassert their ‘animalistic sexuality,’ it reinforces the passivity of white women; this
simultaneously grants the humanity of white women and the inhumanity of Indigenous
women.132 Dually, only racialized people can be framed as real rapists. For when white men are
found guilty of egregious crimes, they are framed as ‘not a real white man.’133 The stranger myth
asserts perpetrators as men who are ‘pathological and different.’134 The media has traditionally
reinforced these notions by framing the actions of perpetrators as “evil beyond rational human
understanding.”135 This negates the larger structures of gendered violence and suggests that ‘real
men’ could not possibly perpetrate such evilness. The reality of these events is then marked as an
anomaly rather than a product of a broader colonial structure that violates women. Conclusively,
the media’s role in framing perpetrators in dually important in negating responsibility from the
colonizers and reasserting the inhumanity of the colonized.
Together, the victim and perpetrator narratives immortalized by the media work to
reinforce frames that negate colonial responsibility in creating a hierarchy fueled by gendered
violence. Often, when media does draw attention to cases involving Indigenous femicide it is
viewed upon heroically as an attempt to bring awareness to the issue. As Mills attests, the reality
is far more sinister. For awareness is only necessary through ignorance and as stated, ignorance
is “militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated…indeed presenting itself unblushingly as
knowledge.”136 By the media assessing the malicious deaths of Indigenous women through the
veneer of investigative knowledge, it merely works to reassert the frames that substantiate the
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reality which they seek to unmask.137 Media coverage dually reinforces the frames that justify the
oppression of Indigenous women and the invisibility of the violence committed against them.
Moreover, it continues to draw the line between the colonizer and the colonized. To reiterate,
Garcia-Del Moral asserts that the continued existence of the ‘other’ requires the repeated
assertion of the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them.’138 Therein, the media plays a fundamental
role in continued dehumanization of Indigenous women and the complimentary assertion of ‘real
men’ as white.
Conclusively, colonialism is essentially the history of dehumanizing Indigenous women.
Colonizers have uniquely constructed Indigenous women as deserving objects of violence. As
discussed throughout this section, numerous frames substantiate this process of dehumanization.
First, gender is a technology of violence manifested by colonialism itself. Second, the
construction of ‘Indigenous women’ as sexualized gendered objects rendered them as inhuman in
the conscience of colonial society. Third, this was embedded by processes of othering and
abjection which assured the exclusion of Indigenous women under morality and law. Fourth,
class and space are embedded reinforcements of the aforementioned frames which deepen the
dehumanization of Indigenous women. Fifth, the media reasserts the boundary between the
subject and other as a masked attempt to achieve awareness. In combination, these forces
uniquely dehumanize Indigenous women in colonial settler societies. For this reason, the
concept of femicide needs to be decolonized. To further substantiate this claim, the next section
will discuss the ways in which Indigenous women are not deservingly represented in the field of
radical feminism which originally coined the term femicide.
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Revisiting the Method: A Critique of Radical Feminism
The term femicide as it is conceptualized presently, emerged “as part of radical feminist
efforts to politicize violence against women, by claiming that women constitute a ‘sex class’
oppressed under a transhistorical patriarchal order.”139 Accordingly, the implementation of the
term largely reflects the tradition of radical feminism.140 In response, critical theorists have
developed a well-founded position which demonstrates the inherent ‘whiteness’ embedded in the
radical feminist tradition.141 The previous section of the paper proved that Indigenous women are
framed in fundamentally different ways than white women in colonial societies. With this,
Indigenous women do not fit into the framework provided by radical feminism and have
consequently become obscured under its conceptions of femicide.142 In this section of the paper,
I will summarize the main critiques which demonstrate the exclusion of Indigenous women
under the radical feminist conceptualization of femicide. First, the radical feminist theory
embodies a strong sense of racial blindness that results in the invisibility of violence against
racialized women. Second, this racial blindness dually encourages intersecting identities to be
misrepresented through what Razack terms, “the optic of vulnerability.”143 Third, radical
feminist theory has traditionally advocated for a path of inclusion which fundamentally
reinforces colonial structures of power. Therein, the concept of femicide as conceptualized by
radical feminist tradition fails to address gendered violence against Indigenous women and the
structural causes of it.
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First, the radical feminist’ definition of femicide has been critiqued as fundamentally
colour blind. As defined by Willis, radical feminism intended to “end male supremacy in all
areas of social and economic life.”144 Though, Willis later argues that the radical feminist
tradition evolved into what she termed as cultural feminism; a counterculture movement that
essentially seeks to liberate women from male imposed values.145 This in itself embodies the
gendered binary of Western culture and accepts it as universal. Furthermore, the radical feminist
tradition continues the historic feminist tradition of conceptualizing all women as one collective
which can lead to the exclusion and invisibility of racialized women.146 First, it numbs the
connection between colonialism and gendered violence in colonial societies. As discussed by
Huhndorf, “gendered violence is not merely a consequence of colonial assaults on land, culture,
and political power but is rather the very paradigm of those assaults.”147 By viewing women as
one collective, it fails to address the specific frames that have contextualized the oppression of
Indigenous women. Second, it requires the separation of identities that are otherwise inseparable.
If women are seen as one collective, how can one explain the context in which racialized women
are more represented in femicide statistics as compared to white women?148 The radical feminist
perspective has traditionally opted to “layer rather than integrate” citing various types of
femicide including racist femicide, marital femicide, homophobic femicide, etc .149 As discussed
by Lugones, such categorization is the foundation of a racialized women’s invisibility, “If
woman and black are terms for homogeneous, atomic, separable categories, then their
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intersection shows us the absence of black women rather than their presence.”150 Consequently,
the duality of being female and Indigenous renders Indigenous women invisible in a categorical
dimension. Therein, the invisibility of Indigenous women is founded in the abeyances of radical
feminism which failed to account for coloniality as a fundamental paradigm of gendered
violence.
Second, the radical feminist conception of femicide views femicide through an optic of
vulnerability. Coined by Razack, the optic of vulnerability observes Indigenous women as
doubly or triply vulnerable to violence as a product of intersectional identity.151 This
misrepresents reality because it separates, as opposed to integrates, the components of an
Indigenous woman’s identity. Radical feminism tends to see race as an additional rather than
integral component of racialized women’s oppression.152 As discussed by Garcia-Del Moral, “the
radical feminist approach sees racial inequality as an added effect… not as a structure imbued
with symbolic and material effects that are also imbricated in the construction of a white
masculine settler subject.”153 The optic of vulnerability furthers this idea. Razack states, “If one
approaches the deaths as the outcome of a generic male violence against women, then race and
coloniality enter as mere complications...Utilizing an optic of vulnerability it is difficult to
consider the perpetrators of the violence and to consider what sexualized violence has to do with
colonialism.”154 By prioritizing oppression through multiple jeopardy conceptualizations, it
separates the present and historical harms perpetrated against Indigenous women.155 Carastathis
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asserts, “Heteropatriarchy power should not be seen as an event but rather as an ongoing
structure that continues to be reproduced.”156 The fragmented categorization of one’s identity
alongside the separation of historic and present violence, dually distorts the connection between
colonialism and the overall structure of gendered violence in colonial settler societies. Therein,
by considering Indigenous femicide through an optic of vulnerability, it alienates the structural
history which underpins the oppression and violence experienced by Indigenous women.
Third, radical feminist theory has often advocated for a path of inclusion in revising the
conception of femicide, this in which retrenches coloniality. To begin, inclusion can work to
silence decolonial critiques. As discussed by Arvin, Tuck & Morrill, “inclusion confers a
preeminent hierarchy, and inclusion is central to hierarchical power. The project of inclusion can
serve to control and absorb dissent rather than allow institutions like feminism and the nationstate to be radically transformed by differing perspectives and goals.”157 Velez & Tuana
reinforce this notion. They discuss how inclusion can often devolve into an awareness likened to
‘epistemic tourism,’ which merely encourages settlers to see beyond their privilege.158 However,
this awareness does little to reinforce Indigenous perspectives and subsequently renders the
‘inclusion’ completely inadequate. Next, the mere inclusion of Indigenous perspectives is
inadequate in changing the fundamental structures that perpetuate the exclusion of Indigenous
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women. Carastathis cites that ‘inclusion’ is falsely purported to be the complimentary opposite to
‘exclusion.’159 For in reality, the roots of exclusion are far more embedded then can be remedied
by inclusion because the colonial settler model itself is built upon legitimating exclusion.160
Crenshaw furthers this notion, with the claim that the intersection of racism and sexism is far
greater than what could be possibly reflected in a white colonial framework.161 This simply
cannot be accomplished through the process of inclusion because the institutions in question are
intrinsically bound to the expansion of the settler colonial state. Thereby, the process of inclusion
is inadequate both in terms of restructuring colonial society and the radical feminist tradition.
This in which requires a decolonial feminist lens when approaching the issue of femicide.
The radical feminist tradition fails to embody the kind of intersectional approach needed
to appreciate femicide in colonial settings. First, the aforementioned method embodies a strong
sense of racial blindness. Second, this racial blindness dually privileges multiple jeopardy
understandings that view intersecting identities through “the optic of vulnerability.”162 Third,
attempts for inclusion are inequipped to remedy the exclusion of Indigenous women because
they are predicated on the ultimate reinforcement of coloniality. In the following section, I will
discuss the ways that international conceptions of femicide largely embody the radical feminist
tradition, as well as provide other critiques to its cotemporary implementation.
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Coloniality and Conceptualizing Femicide in International
Frameworks
This section will discuss coloniality and its relevance to the term femicide as it is situated
in international frameworks and the international regime on VAW. For the purposes of this work,
I evaluate international legal and political frameworks broadly; this is intended to demonstrate
how the conception of femicide needs to be decolonized in all aspects of international structures.
As discussed by Arvin, Tuck & Morrill, settler colonialism is maintained because inclusion
places justice in parallel with the expansion of the settler state.163 With this and as will be
discussed in greater detail in the following section, true decolonization must include a
breakdown in the logic of colonial modernity which identifies the implicit maintenance of settler
colonialism and Indigenous oppression. As such, Lugones describes “Decolonizing gender is a
necessarily praxical task. It is to enact a critique of racialized, colonial, and capitalist
heterosexual gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social.”164 In addition, though it
has been used previously and throughout the paper, the term coloniality “refers to long-standing
patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor,
intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial
administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism.”165 Similarly, settler colonialism
survives colonialism because “The primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather
than the surplus value to be derived from mixing native labour with it.”166 This is especially
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relevant in relation to this discussion because international law is rooted in a history which
observes states founded on the dispossession of Indigenous lands as inherently legitimate and it
is a direct product of the coloniality of power. The following critiques will demonstrate
international frameworks and law as a product of coloniality. First, likened to the radical feminist
tradition, contemporary conceptualizations of femicide understand all women as a single
collective. Second, the current VAW framework is situated in a broader human rights regime
which reinforces colonial power structures. Finally, international frameworks continue to rely on
a priori approach to determining discrimination as a matter of one identity or another, as opposed
to the holistic conception of identity. Thereby, international frameworks uphold a conception of
femicide that does not address the situation of Indigenous women adequately.
First, contemporary conceptualizations of femicide understand all women as a single
collective. As per the Vienna Declaration on Femicide, femicide is defined as “the killing of
women and girls because of their gender.”167 This definition is generally congruent with
Russell’s definition aforementioned which cites femicide as “the killing of females by males
because they are females."168 As previously critiqued, this definition does not have the capacity
to appreciate oppression beyond elements of gender or sex.169 In failing to recognize the depth of
various identities, it continues to perpetuate aforementioned myths that see all women as
white.170 With this, it reinforces the bias in the radical feminist tradition which conceptualizes
women as one collective. New approaches in the field have gained ground in promoting a greater
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appreciation for intersectionality. VAW frameworks have increasingly broadened their initial
focus on gender and patriarchy to include other intersectional elements.171 Even still and as
Lugones suggests, it does not go far enough.172 As will be discussed in greater depth below,
international frameworks fail to recognize the degree of coloniality that exists because
international relations are a product of colonial creation.
Second, the current VAW framework is situated in a broader human rights regime which
reinforces colonial power structures. Maldonado-Torres, Shalhoub-Kervorkian & Dasher-Nashif,
and Fregoso cite coloniality is strongly tied to law at both the domestic and international level.173
Meyersfield discusses, international law is based on the primacy of sovereignty where
intervention is only possible where a state fails to protect the human rights of a particular group
and the international community agrees on the decision to intervene.174 Nagy states, “the statecentric nature of international law assumes the legitimacy of settler state sovereignty.”175
Accordingly, international law is a product of coloniality which reproduces itself through the
constructed legitimacy of colonial settler states. This permeates virtually every aspect of
international legal and political mechanisms, including the human rights regime. Asserted by
Fregoso, there is an inexorable relationship between what constitutes human and human rights.176
As previously discussed, Indigenous women have been constructed as non-women, inhuman in
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colonial societies.177 Therein, broadly excluding Indigenous women from the benefit of the
VAW framework, which assures justice on the basis of being constructed as human.178 In failing
to recognize coloniality explicitly, the current VAW framework and human rights regime is
stymied in its ability to address the root causes of femicide perpetrated against Indigenous
women. Thereby, coloniality needs to be specifically accounted for to assure the visibility of
Indigenous women in international frameworks.
Third, international frameworks continue to rely on a priori approach to determining
discrimination as a matter of one identity or another, as opposed to the holistic conception of
identity. This is especially relevant where cases of femicide are tried in international courts such
as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Sosa studied the implementation of intersectional
approaches in cases relating to femicide tried the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This
research found, intersectionality typically emerges in international courts in the form of the nondiscrimination clause. As stated, “The traditional approach to equality incudes the nondiscrimination clause (non-discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, etc), which is
often the only tangible basis for defending intersectionality legally. But even this only focuses on
a single ground as the basis of legal claims.”179 To put this finding into conversation with
Maldonado-Torres work on the coloniality of being, a characteristic feature of social
classifications such as ‘race, colour, sex, language, etc’ is that it assures that the subject
embodiment of those terms are vertical in nature.180 Therein, the categorical nature of this clause
requires that one factor of identity is privileged over another. Yet as previously discussed, the
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frames which oppress Indigenous women are specifically tailored to Indigenous women; not
separate byproducts of being classified as ‘Indigenous’ and as ‘woman.’ As further discussed by
Sosa, “relation among multiple categories of difference cannot be determined a priori. In other
words, while recognizing that gender, race and class intersect, one cannot assume that gender is
per se predominant over race, class or whatever other category, and vice versa.”181 Given that the
non-discrimination clause ‘focuses on a single ground,’ it inherently violates adept
understandings of identity. Furthermore, it continues to create invisibility for the experiences of
women who have multifaceted identities. Conclusively, international legal frameworks continue
to obstruct the visibility of Indigenous women and limit their space for recourse in the broader
VAW framework.
Therein, the concept of femicide exists in international frameworks and international law
as a product of coloniality. The following critiques demonstrated this. First, the definition of
femicide used by international frameworks embodies the radical feminist tradition in
conceptualizing all women as a single collective. Second, the current VAW framework is
situated in a broader human rights regime which reinforces colonial power structures. Finally,
international frameworks reinforce categorical divisions in failing to appreciate the intersection
of various factors of identity. To reiterate, international frameworks uphold a conception of
femicide that does not address the situation of Indigenous women adequately. Many critical
scholars have come to recognize this fact as true and have theorized solutions accordingly. In the
following section, I will discuss some of the solutions put forth to address the decolonization of
the concept of femicide at the international level.
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Towards Decolonial Feminism: Identifying Solutions to Decolonize
‘Femicide’ in International Frameworks
The school of decolonial feminism emerged as a revisionist philosophy which identified
the need to think beyond the bounds of modernity and its links to Eurocentric thought.182 As
discussed by Grosfoguel, “the hegemonic Euro-centric paradigms that have informed western
philosophy and sciences in the ‘modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system’ for the last
500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view.”183 The school of
decolonial feminism attempts to disturb these views. Though somewhat incongruous to use an
anecdote traditionally rooted in Eurocentric thought, decolonial feminism demands that Plato’s
prisoners attempt to understand the world from outside of the cave. The school of decolonial
feminism provides space to think beyond the bounds of modern thought and as will be discussed,
this can take numerous forms. In the following paragraphs, I will present three solutions put
forth by scholars that seek to achieve the goals of decolonial feminism and attempt to decolonize
the term femicide in international frameworks. First, a pluriversal human rights regime envisions
alternate understandings of rights that supersede Eurocentric enlightenment theory. Second,
many Latin American scholars have looked upon the term ‘Feminicidio’ as a conceptualization
of the phenomenon which gives greater credence to colonial history. Third, a brief evaluation of
how intersectionality both contradicts and supplements decolonial feminism in constructing
decolonial frameworks. Though not all solutions inherently stem from the decolonial feminist
method, they all share the decolonial feminist goal of decolonizing frameworks at large.
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First, a pluriversal human rights regime attempts to develop understandings of rights that
supersede Eurocentric enlightenment theory. The international VAW framework is embedded in
a larger human rights regime that observes femicide and VAW as an infringement on human
rights. Eurocentric conception of rights are based upon the realization of rights through a
subjective version of what constitutes humanity.184 ‘Natural rights’ and philosophies developed
through the Enlightenment, compose the foundation of the present human rights regime.185 Rene
Descartes is often cited as the “founder of Modern Western Philosophy.”186 The Cartesian egocogito embodied through “I think, therefore I am,” is a fundamental marking in philosophy that
placed white men at the helm of subjectivity. As described by Grosfoguel, “By producing a
dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim nonsituated, universal, God-eyed view knowledge.”187 More than this, by substantiating the line
between mind and body, it evokes questions about the line between human and non-human.
Maldonado-Torres explains:
If the ego cogito was built upon the foundations of the ego conquiro, the ‘I think,
therefore I am’ presupposes two unacknowledged dimensions. Beneath the ‘I think’ we
can read ‘others do not think’, and behind the ‘I am’ it is possible to locate the
philosophical justification for the idea that ‘others are not’ or do not have being. In this
way we are led to uncover the complexity of the Cartesian formulation.188
Accordingly, the ego cogito dually reinforces the legitimacy of Western men as proprietors of
subjectivity and the separation of humanity from other. It is this logic that underpins the
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contemporary human rights regime. Though said regime does claim universality and equality for
all, it becomes evident that universality refers to the universe of coloniality and equality only
applies to colonial subjectivity of human. With this, Fregoso proposes the notion of pluriversal
human rights to be discussed in the next paragraph.
Coined by Fregoso, pluriversal human rights re-envision rights “beyond European
time/space and the normative view of rights as abstract legal principles that seem as though they
have existed since time without memory.”189 Fregoso provides an in-depth manifesto as to what
a Declaration of Pluriversal Human Rights would embody. Risking oversimplification, I briefly
cite three distinctive features which characterize a pluriversal human rights regime. To begin, a
pluriversal human rights regime would move away from state-centrism. As mentioned
previously, the state centric logic of contemporary international law reinforces the legitimacy of
settler colonial states.190 Accordingly, a pluriversal human rights regime would avoid such
legitimation and instead link the concept of rights back to a social collective rather than a social
contract. Next, a pluriversal human rights regime would detach itself from law by bounding itself
to a social collective rather than a state centric institution. As stated, state-centrism bounds
people to rights through law. Repeated numerously throughout this paper, law itself is a colonial
tool that holds little appreciation for the prevention of violence against Indigenous women.191
Fregoso elaborates on this, “By redefining the ethical human as the "juridical human,"
colonial/modern law instituted a "relationship of bondage to the law," which in effect "worked to
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foreclose other scenarios for the human."192 Therein, a pluriversal human rights regime would be
bound by a responsibility to the social collective as opposed to law; this in which leads to the last
point. Finally, pluriversal human rights hold a greater appreciation for collective rights.
Foreshadowed throughout this paragraph, pluriversal human rights are fundamentally based on
responsibility or duty to a social collective. This greatly reflects Indigenous rights frameworks
where “an individual s interrelatedness and sense of belonging entails a multiplicity of duties and
obligations to the social/collective.”193 This too does not necessitate a ‘universal’ or prevailing
code of morality. As discussed, “arguing for the world of pluriversal coexistence instead of
universal dominance, imposed by force or cunning of the ruling minority.”194 Conclusively, a
pluriversal human rights regime seeks to decolonize the rights by operating outside the bounds of
logic which substantiate it; allowing greater visibility for Indigenous women as deserving
subjects of rights.
Second, Latin American scholars have looked upon the term ‘Feminicidio’ for greater
appreciation of the colonial context. As previously discussed, femicide as it is understood by
Western scholars, is a limited concept to understand the killing of women as a product of
colonial structures of power.195 Latin American scholars Marcela Lagarde and Julia Monárrez
are largely credited with translating the concept of femicide to feminicidio. Upon analyzing the
murders of women in Ciudad Juarez, Lagarde and Monárrez independently sought to develop a
concept that was more contextual than just the gendered version of homicide.196 For Lagarde, the
most major difference between the conceptualization of femicide and feminicidio is the way they
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understand the role of the state.197 Lagarde understands the murders in Ciudad Juarez as a failure
of the state to protect women as a result of gendered institutions complicit in violence.198
Identifying the state as a culpable party in gendered violence is an important step in unpacking
the coloniality of colonial settler states. Yet as will be discussed in the following paragraph,
Lagarde fell just short in this endeavour. For Monárrez, feminicidio is the product of a complex
intersection between state, class and power.199 Monárrez links the state’s failure to protect
women as a matter of gendered neoliberalism.200 Garcia-Del Moral cites this notion as generally
congruent with the decolonial feminist understanding of “capitalist colonial modernity.”201 With
special emphasis on class, Monárrez discusses how female maquila workers are exploited and
discarded, rendering them as disposable as any other object commodity.202 This conception of
feminicidio helps to access the notion put forth by Razack which cites the idea that slum
administration replaced colonial administration. Where certain spaces and the class objects
within them are naturalized as violent.203 Still, Monárrez does not unpack the full relevance of
the colonial history that underpins these intersections. In the following paragraph, I discuss the
critiques made towards the concept of feminicidio.
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While feminicidio provides greater intersectional context, it too fails to decolonize the
concept of study. Garcia-Del Moral asserts, the aforementioned conceptions of feminicidio
reflect the previous critiques cited against the radical feminist tradition. To begin, Garcia-Del
Moral states that Lagarde’s conception sees “gender as a principle of social organization
premised on hierarchical relations.”204 As previously discussed, this is a direct manifestation of
colonial imposed understandings of gender.205 Too, Lagarde’s conception of feminicidio only
sees the phenomenon of feminicidio as “a partial breakdown of the rule of law” because the state
is incapable of adhering to human rights. With this, aforementioned critiques regarding the
coloniality of the international human rights regime become relevant. Next, Monárrez takes a
more comprehensive stance with understandings of class and modernity, but too is stymied by
the pitfalls of the radical feminist approach.206 Monárrez cites that the systemic reproductions of
violence in Ciudad Juarez are predominantly the result of the state reinforcing “patriarchal
dominance and forces.”207 This however, fails to identify the coloniality imbued within the
state’s assertions of patriarchy. Accordingly, Monárrez concept of feminicidio somewhat mimics
the decolonial feminist assertions of patriarchy of a product of colonial modernity. But it fails to
draw the connection explicitly and subsequently reinforces coloniality. Therein, Latin American
scholarship has adopted more contextual understandings of femicide, though have not come to
decolonize the concept completely.
Third, intersectionality holds potential to both contradict and supplement decolonial
feminism in constructing decolonial frameworks. As previously discussed, international human
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rights courts and the regime at large, has adopted more intersectional approaches in recent
years.208 This however has received mixed reviews in the school of decolonial feminism. In this
school, intersectionality is often viewed as a reinforcement of colonial imposed logic. To begin,
intersectionality attempts to understand the experience of a person through the intersection of
categorical identities.209 As previously discussed, categories in and of themselves, are
technologies engineered to reinforce hierarchy in colonial societies.210 As stated by Lugones,
“Crenshaw understands race and gender as categories of oppression in the very logical terms
assumed in the hegemonic mainstream: as logically separate from each other.”211 With this,
intersectionality inherently reinforces the assumption that such categories are naturally
separate.212 As stated by Mingolo, “it is not enough to change the content of the conversation,
that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation.” Accordingly, intersectionality
fails to go beyond the logic imposed by coloniality and subsequently reinforces it. Furthermore,
intersectionality wrongly asserts visibility through intersection, in actuality, exceeding
categorical logic results in invisibility. Lugones argues that intersectionality assumes the
convergence of separate identities rather than a holistic existence of them. 213 As asserted by
Keating, this serves as a relabeling process more than it creates visibility for vulnerable
groups.214 Ultimately, this suggests that intersectionality dually reinforces colonial logic and the
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continued invisibility of groups targeted by categorization.215 Thereby, critiques of
intersectionality made by the decolonial feminist school have called to question whether the two
can be employed cohesively; this will be further discussed in the following paragraph.
As demonstrated, many decolonial feminist scholars assert that decolonial feminism and
intersectionality are incompatible.216 However, others suggest that there is potential for
partnership between the two. Thomas provides a bridging critique which suggests the theories
are more compatible than suggested by Lugones.217 As stated:
Although it may appear on the surface that intersectional theory argues for a separation of
identities like race and gender, it must be understood that intersectional theory (properly
performed) refers to the single-axis logics already in place…an analytical tool to be used
to challenge the misgivings epistemic subjects feel because of a lack of multidimensional
frameworks.218
In this understanding, Thomas suggests that intersectionality does not justify categorical
distinction but rather acknowledges the flaws of their existence.219 These assertions demonstrate
the ways in which the theories could work in epistemic parallel. Still, Thomas admits that
intersectionality certainly engages with the assumption that race and gender are categorically
separate; this in which ultimately conflicts with decolonial feminist tradition.220 With this
Carastathis suggests, “a deployment of intersectionality that would be compatible with
decolonial politics would have to go “beyond narrow forms of identity and left-liberal
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discourse,” in which it is, currently, too often mired.”221 By integrating more intersectional
approaches, it has potential to work towards an ultimate project of decolonization. Still,
Carastathis asserts that intersectionality “cannot itself be equated with ‘decolonizing’…but
seems to be a necessary condition for moving in a decolonial direction.”222 By engaging
intersectionality strictly as a critique of the falsity of categorical logic, it has the potential to aid
the process of decolonization. Still, there is contention in the decolonial feminist school
regarding the validity of this matter. Therein, disagreement exists regarding whether integrating
intersectional approaches would help or harm the project of decolonization regarding terms such
as ‘femicide’ at the international level.
Conclusively, the solutions proposed intend to decolonize the concept of ‘femicide’ in
international frameworks. Though not all solutions inherently stem from the decolonial feminist
method, they bear some relation to, and semblance with the goals of the method. First, a
pluriversal human rights regime attempts to decolonize the concept of femicide by decolonizing
the contemporary human rights regime for which it is embedded. Second, the term ‘Feminicidio’
has been revered as a more whole conception of femicide which grants greater space to make
connections with colonial history. Third, intersectionality remains a controversial partner for
decolonial feminism as it has the potential to both contradict and supplement the decolonization
of political and legal frameworks. In the next section, I discuss critiques of the inquiry into
Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) that essentially stem from these
notions.
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Applying the Argument: Femicide, the MMIWG Inquiry and Canada
In this section, I will apply the preceding discussion to the case of Indigenous femicide in
Canada. In Canada, Indigenous women are almost 4.5 times more likely to be murdered than
their non-Indigenous counterparts. Indigenous women compose 16 percent of all female
homicide victims where they represent only 4 percent of the overall population. Of these cases,
only 54 percent have led to a homicide charge as compared to the national indictment rate of 84
percent.223 Evidently, the law plays an immense role in perpetuating, defining, and potentially
reducing the phenomenon of discussion. As discussed by Razack, it is through the ‘grey zones’
of the law that violence not just occurs, but is ‘authorized’ against Indigenous women.224 In
Canada, political action on the issue of missing and murdered Indigenous women has been
largely pursued through the mobilization of international human rights law.225 The National
Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) is an example of
this. In 2016, a symposium of Canadian legal scholars, human rights experts from the United
Nations, and representatives from the Inter-American Court on Human Rights assembled to
discuss a national inquiry into MMIWG.226 Throughout the process, the MMIWG inquiry report
has been critiqued on numerous grounds, most of which stem from the ways that the inquiry has
retrenched coloniality.227 First, the inquiry is embedded in a larger human rights law tradition
that views colonial states as legitimate. Second, the inquiry worked to reproduce what Razack
cites as ‘colonial truths’ that continue to frame Indigenous women as the ‘other.’ Third, the
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inquiry failed to use language that gave due culpability to present structures of colonial power.
Thereby, this section will demonstrate the ways the contemporary conception of femicide has
failed to properly address the issue of femicide in Canada, specifically in relation to the Inquiry
into MMIWG.
First, the inquiry into MMIWG reinforced the legitimacy of the Canadian state and
colonial structures of power. As previously discussed, human rights law is state-centric and
consequently reaffirms the legitimacy of settler colonial states.228 Given that the MMIWG
inquiry was largely designed by and embedded within a broader human rights framework, it
inherited the state-centric quality. Therein, the inquiry into MMIWG observed the state as a
moderator rather than a biased party with entrenched interest in the reaffirmation of coloniality.
Part of the way in which the legitimacy of the Canadian state was affirmed in the inquiry, was
the way in which the report addressed ‘colonial structures.’ The report recognizes that structures
of colonialism exist today.229 The report discusses structures as an extenuation of poverty, lack of
services, the justice system and so on. However, as the decolonial feminist school advocates, the
truth of the matter is insufficient if it fails to reveal the fundamental constructions of power that
perpetuate coloniality. This includes the frames that construct colonial subjectivity through
oppositional binaries and categorical dimensions.230 The report fell short of doing so and
accordingly, reinforced the legitimacy of the state by endorsing its conceptions of subjectivity
through omission. A decolonized conception of the term ‘femicide’ would understand such
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constructions as the fundamental cause of the violence experienced by Indigenous women.
Therein, disallowing the state to avoid its role in the perpetration of coloniality.
Second, the inquiry into MMIWG sought to reaffirm ‘colonial truths’ that other
Indigenous women. As discussed by Razack, “Inquiries often function to reproduce colonial
truths. In the case of an inquiry into missing and murdered Indigenous women, the colonial truth
that is reproduced can be a story about Indigenous dysfunction rather than a story of colonial
violence and dispossession.” This often manifests itself in narratives about class and space,
especially in relation to victims who are sex workers. A passage from the report cites, “Many
survivors who shared their experience of poverty, homelessness, and violence talked about exchanging sex in order to meet their basic needs.”231 While factors such as class and space
undoubtedly play a role, the lack of explicit connection drawn between these factors and colonial
history simultaneously distances the culpability of colonizers in constructing those realities.
Without the continuous mention of explicit connections to colonialism, the report quickly
devolves into a reinforcement of ‘colonial truths’ that contribute to the othering of Indigenous
women as previously discussed. Therein, the reassertion of ‘colonial truths’ existent in the
inquiry into MMIWG is indicative of the need to draw explicit connections between colonialism
and the violence experienced by Indigenous women; a decolonized conceptualization of femicide
would assure this.

Third, the inquiry failed to utilize language that assigned due responsibility to colonial
structures of power. ‘Femicide’ is not mentioned in either volume of the MMIWG report.
Garcia-Del Moral finds, “The murders of Indigenous women in Canada have only been

“Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Canada,” 2019, 661.
231

Diebold 56
sporadically characterized as femicides.”232 There are two important reasons for this. First, by
merely suggesting that Indigenous women are ‘overrepresented’ in homicide statistics, it fails to
cite colonial structures of power as the cause. The Canadian government has long insisted on
pursuing a strategy of racelessness that hides “the law’s complicity in settler violence.”233 With
this, the exclusion of the word femicide eludes to the problem without initially citing the
structural causes. Second, the absence of the term could point to the fact that the concept as it
exists presently inadequately describes the phenomenon of discussion.234 Often activists adopt
terms that the government avoids in an attempt to politicize a particular issue. For example, the
way in which the radical feminist movement attempted to politicize the issue of gendered
violence by employing the term femicide.235 However, the term femicide has largely not been
utilized in this way. As Garcia-Del Moral finds, “Indigenous activists mobilizing against these
killings do not use the concept of femicide; neither do their feminist allies, the Canadian
Feminist Alliance for International Action (FAFIA) raises the question of whether femicide is an
adequate concept to analyze violence against Indigenous women.”236 Garcia-Del Moral later
asserts the inadequacy of femicide and the need for a reconceptualization that more precisely and
explicitly identifies the role of colonial powers in perpetuating violence.237 With this, I concur
and contend that the MMIWG inquiry failed to adopt a concept that placed due blame of
coloniality and colonial structures of power in Canada.
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Thereby, the contemporary understandings of femicide have failed to properly address
the issue of femicide in Canada, specifically in relation to the Inquiry into MMIWG. As result,
the MMIWG inquiry report has retrenched coloniality.238 First, the inquiry inherently reinforced
the legitimacy of the Canadian state and the colonial structures of power which fuel it. Second,
the inquiry worked to reproduced ‘colonial truths’ that reinforced frames which see Indigenous
women as the ‘other.’ Third, the inquiry failed to employ a concept of the phenomenon that gave
due culpability to present structures of colonial power. In the case of the MMIWG inquiry,
though it did not cite the term ‘femicide’ explicitly it observed the phenomenon of study through
the legitimation of coloniality. This is dually indicative of the need to decolonize the concept of
femicide and subsequently promote the use of the decolonized concept. Razack cites that “An
inquiry that breaks this pattern is one that keeps Indigenous sovereignty at the centre of its
vision… Such an inquiry would ask: what does sexualized violence have to do with
colonialism?”239 It is for this reason that a reconceptualization of the term femicide is integral to
the process of decolonization. A decolonized conceptualization of femicide would cite structures
of coloniality as eminent in the creation of frames that authorize violence against Indigenous
women.
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Conclusion
There is an immense need for the term ‘femicide’ to be decolonized in international legal
and political frameworks, as the entirety of this literature review attests. An elaboration on the
definition, history, and methods surrounding the concept of ‘femicide’ has identified the
invisibility of Indigenous women under the contemporary concept and the subsequent need for
decolonization. The solutions proposed are not without flaw, but at the very least, demonstrate a
necessary movement towards the decolonial feminist approach. Further to this, the Canadian case
proves the need to decolonize the term through a demonstration of the pitfalls of its current
conceptualization at the intersection of international law and domestic adaptations. True
discusses that in issues of gendered violence, “funding is focused on protection and prosecution,
not prevention of violence against women.”240 Certainly, increasing attention should be given to
the prevention of violence against women. However, there is a profound importance in creating
visibility for Indigenous women in the law. At both the domestic and international law, law is the
essence of coloniality. In dismantling coloniality, any small adjustment or attempt at ‘inclusion’
only reinforces existing structures of power. With this, there is a compelling necessity to adopt
decolonial solutions wholly; a necessity to deconstruct what colonial societies understand as
‘common sense’ or as natural truth; and a necessity to assure that all of this happens in a timely
manner. For anything less, only seeks to assure that the violence experienced by Indigenous
women is never seen for what it truly is; an attempt by white men to annihilate a group who
challenged their dominance through an egalitarian existence.

240

True, 2012, 22.

Diebold 59

Bibliography
Arvin, Maile, Eve Tuck & Angie Morrill. 2013. “Decolonizing Feminism: Challenging
Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy.” Feminist Formations
25(1): 8-34. doi:10.1353/ff.2013.0006.
Bandelli, Daniela. 2017. Femicide, Gender & Violence: Discourses and Counterdiscourses in
Italy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bowman, Melanie. 2020. “Privileged Ignorance, ‘World’- Traveling, and Epistemic Tourism.”
Hypatia 35 (3): 475-489. DOI:10.1017/hyp.2020.25
Burke, Megan. 2019. When Time Warps: The Lived Experience of Gender, Race, and Sexual
Violence. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.
Busamante, Priscilla, Gaurav Jashnani & Brett G. Stoudt. 2018. “Theorizing Cumulative
Dehumanization: An Embodied Praxis of ‘Becoming’ and Resisting Sanctioned
Violence.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 13(1): 1-13.
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12429
Campbell, Jacquelyn & Carol W. Runyan. 1998. “Femicide: Guest Editors Introduction.”
Homicide Studies 2 (4): 347-352.
Carastathis, Anna. 2016. “Intersectionality and Decolonial Feminism.” In Intersectionality:
Origins, Contestations, Horizons. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 199-232.
Corona, Ignacio. 2010. “Over Their Dead Bodies: Reading the Newspapers on Gender
Violence.” In Gender Violence at the US-Mexico Border: Media Representation and
Public Response eds. Hector Dominguez-Ruvalcaba & Ignacio Corona. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press. 104-127. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1814jwp
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